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China’s Foreign Exchange Policy: Global Effects and United States
Policy Options
Brian Tribuna

“China’s unfair currency policies have cost millions of Americans their jobs, and I
believe inaction on this issue is dangerous to our economic recovery and continues to put at risk
hundreds of thousands of additional American jobs. When I travel around my district, I hear
from small businesses and manufacturers on this issue. And they never ask for Congress to
guarantee their success. All they want is a fair fight, for the rules to be the same. And I believe
given a level playing field, American businesses will win every single time.”1
China’s currency and exchange rate policy is the focus of much political rhetoric in the
United States. Many politicians and economists argue that China is keeping the remnimbi
(RMB) artificially undervalued, which in turn gives them an unfair advantage in international
trade at the expense of United States manufacturers and workers. As displayed by Congressman
Donnelly in the above quote, many in the political arena blame China’s exchange rate policy for
a multitude of problems facing the United States economy. Fresh off a presidential election, both
candidates made it clear that they were going to “get tough” on China. Republican nominee Mitt
Romney went as far as declaring “I will label China as it is, a currency manipulator. And they
will recognize that if they cheat, there is a price to pay.”2 President Obama has also been quoted
as saying that “China’s trade surplus is directly related to its manipulation of its currency’s
value.”3 Others are not so sure that the problem is as serious and clear-cut. John Frisbie, the
President of the U.S.-China Business Council, recognized that “[b]oth presidential candidates
have said they will ‘get tough’ on China, but evidence has shown that the best way to make

1

157 CONG. REC. H6863-01 (Oct. 13, 2011) (statement of Donnelly) (West)
Romney on China, 2012 REPUBLICAN CANDIDATES (Apr. 12, 2013, 2:03 PM), http://2012.republicancandidates.org/Romney/China.php
3
Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, Currency “manipulation” and world trade: A caution, VOXEU (Jan. 30,
2009), http://www.voxeu.org/article/currency-manipulation-and-world-trade-three-reasons-caution
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progress is through comprehensive engagement – not political rhetoric.”4 James Dorn, a China
specialist at the Cato Institute, warns that “[b]laming China for our woes is politically attractive
but dangerous.”5 Instead of rash, politically charged, unilateral action by the United States
against China to combat this perceived unfair economic imbalance, the United States should take
a balanced, cautious, and collaborative effort to promote the economic and political interests of
both countries.
Part I of this paper will start with an overview of international monetary systems
throughout history and then focus on China’s exchange rate policy, covering its evolution over
the past several decades to its current state, its technical application in the context of the
international monetary system, allegations that the Chinese government is artificially keeping the
RMB undervalued. Next this section will take a comparative look at the macroeconomic
strategies employed by the United States and China to gain a better understanding of why
China’s exchange rate policy has become such a hot button political issue in the United States.
Part II of this paper will examine unilateral policy options being considered by the United States
to counter this perceived unfair trade practice by China. Most of these options seem to be
politically charged rather than based in sound political and diplomatic strategy, and this section
will explore why such actions would most likely turn out to not only be ineffective, but
dangerous and detrimental to United States economic relationships. Part III will look at the
potential for a balanced, collaborative, multilateral approach at the international level. These
options include employing international economic organizations such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO) or International Monetary Fund (IMF) and global economic forums such as
the Group of Twenty (G-20). The paper will conclude with a recommended course of action for
James A. Dorn, China and the Truth about the Senate’s Exchange Rate Oversight Act, CATO INSTITUTE (Oct. 4,
2011) http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/china-truth-about-senates-exchange-rate-oversight-act
5
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4
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the United States and the rest of the international economic community that focuses on
collaboration and formation of symbiotic relationships instead of specific targeted attacks that
could have serious negative consequences worldwide. International monetary policy, and the
United States-China economic relationship in particular, is a highly complex and politically
sensitive issue that needs to be approached in a manner that will promote global prosperity while
simultaneously avoiding another catastrophic international financial crisis.

International Monetary Policies

The bulk of China’s most substantial monetary policy reform has occurred since the
founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. A brief history of international
monetary systems alongside China’s own reforms will be helpful in understanding the context of
the current issues.
History of International Monetary Systems
The last two centuries have witnessed dramatic changes to international monetary
systems. Prior to World War I, global currencies generally followed a gold or silver standard6,
where each nation’s currency was backed by and freely convertible into the precious metal
pledged behind it.7 Following turbulent economic times, marked by two World Wars and the
Great Depression, leaders from the Allied Nations met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to
craft an international monetary system that would “combine the advantage of the classical gold
standard (i.e. exchange rate stability) with the advantage of floating rates (i.e. independence to

6

Justin Yifu Lin et al., Reform of the International Monetary System: A Jagged History and Uncertain Prospects,
(The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 6070, May 2012). While most nations during the period
followed the gold standard, some, including China, followed the silver standard.
7
Id.
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pursue national full employment policies).”8 The Bretton Woods regime fixed foreign currencies
against the United States dollar, and the United States dollar was fixed at $35 per ounce of gold.9
“Member countries could hold their official reserves mainly in the form of gold or dollardenominated assets and had the right to sell their dollars to the US Federal Reserve in exchange
for gold at the official price.”10 Another important aspect of the Bretton Woods meetings was the
establishment of the IMF11, whose responsibilities has greatly evolved since and are explored in
greater depth in Part III on this paper. Even though exchange rates were fixed to the U.S. dollar,
these rates were subject to change given they met a certain set of requirements as determined by
the IMF.12
A series of issues with the Bretton Woods system, including United States
macroeconomic policies and increased spending during the Vietnam War, led President Nixon to
officially end convertibility of the U.S. Dollar to gold. 13 These actions set the groundwork for the
prevailing international monetary system observed today, where most major currencies are in a
free float against each other based on global market supply and demand, subject to certain
limitations.14
History of China’s Monetary System

8

MICHAEL D. BORDO & BARRY EICHENGREEN, The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A Historical
Overview, in A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM: LESSONS FOR INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
REFORM, (University of Chicago Press, Jan. 1993) (available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6867.pdf).
9
Lin, supra note 6.
10
Lin, supra note 6.
11
The main purpose of the World Bank was to “help integrate the less-developed economies into the world
economy… through a combination of advice, direct loans, and guarantees of third party loans.” Philip O’Hara,
Bretton Woods System and the Post Bretton Woods System, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (available
at http://www.econ.tcu.edu/harvey/5133/bretton.html)
12
Lin, supra note 6.
13
Richard Nixon, President of United States, Address to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy: “The
Challenge of Peace.”, (Aug. 15, 1974) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3115) Nixon
also announced in his speech a ten percent tariff on all goods imported to the United States and a temporary freeze
on wages and prices of goods to combat potential inflationary effects of the suspension.
14
O’Hara, supra note 11.
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When the PRC was founded in 1949, the “new central government unified the banking
system by establishing a national bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), and a national
currency” called the remnimbi (translated literally at the “people’s money”).15 The two major
policies embraced by the PBOC in the early years of the PRC included “forbidding circulation of
foreign currencies within China and… providing for state supervision over all inflows and
outflows of foreign exchange.”16 This regime, which contributed to low levels of foreign direct
investment, was largely held in place through the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping took his place
as the paramount leader of China and started liberalizing trade and economic policies.17
Throughout the 1980s and into the mid 1990s China employed a dual exchange rate
system, which was composed of an “official fixed exchange rate system,” used by the
government, and another system used as the official avenue for importers and exporters to gain
access to RMB conversion through swap markets in which the rate was relatively marketbased.18 This created a lucrative black market for foreign exchange, sometimes referred to as a
third exchange system, because there was a large discrepancy in the rate between the two
markets. 19 In 1993 the official government rate for RMB-dollar conversion set at 5.77 yuan
versus 7.70 yuan in the swap markets.20
In 1994 the Chinese government merged the dual exchange system and pegged the RMBdollar conversion rate at 8.70 yuan.21 This new system is best categorized as a “market-based
managed float system,” where the central bank initially maintained the stated 8.70 rate, but
15

Larry L. Drumm, Changing Money: Foreign Exchange Reform in the People's Republic of China, 18 Hastings
Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 359, 362 (1995).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
WAYNE M. MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21625, CHINA’S CURRENCY POLICY: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC ISSUES (2011)
19
Larry Drumm article
20
MORRISON, supra note 18.
21
Bryan Mercurio & Celine Sze Ning Leung, Is China a “Currency Manipulator”?: The Legitimacy of China’s
Exchange Regime Under the Current International Legal Framework, 43 Int’l Law. 1257, 1261 (2009).
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allowed intraday rates to float by 0.3% among banks trading the RMB.22 Eventually in 1997, the
official stated rate was allowed to increase to 8.28 yuan.23 China was able to maintain this dollar
peg by “buying (or selling) as many dollar denominated assets in exchange for newly printed
yuan as needed to eliminate excess demand (supply) for the yuan.”24 This regime, which is the
same method used to maintain the RMB’s current valuation, effectively counters market forces
that determine exchange rates of other major currencies that are traded on a free-floating market.
China justified this regime, as they similarly do today, by stating that it was intended to promote
economic stability and encourage foreign investment during periods of rapid growth while the
nation’s economy was still in developing stages.25
In 2005, China further liberalized their monetary policy by instituting another 2.1%
appreciation and pegging the yuan to a basket of currencies, rather than the dollar alone.26 The
daily intraday trading range was also increased from 0.3% to 0.5% against this new basket of
currencies. Since 2005, China has continued, albeit at what many consider too slow of a pace, to
gradually implement policies that have lead to an appreciation of the RMB. There was a
temporary suspension of RMB appreciation during the global financial crisis, where the RMB
was again pegged at a fixed rate to the U.S. Dollar, partly in response to a decreased demand for
Chinese exports.27 Since RMB appreciation resumed in June 2010, China has committed to

22

Id.
MORRISON, supra note 18.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Mercurio, supra note 21, at 1261. While the precise composition of this currency basket has never been disclosed,
China has stated that it is linked primarily to the dollar, euro, yen, and a few other major currencies. Economic
indicators however show that the exchange rate is still highly responsive to movement of the dollar, so it is very
likely the basket is heavily weighted towards the dollar.
27
See MORRISON, supra note 18, “China halted its currency appreciation policy around mid-July 2008, mainly
because of declining global demand for Chinese products that resulted from the effects of the global financial crisis.
In 2009, Chinese exports and imports fell by 15.9% and 11.3% over 2008 levels. The Chinese government reported
that thousands of export-oriented factories were shut down and that over 20 million migrant workers lost their jobs
in 2009 because of the direct effects of the global economic slowdown. The RMB/dollar exchange was held
relatively constant at 6.83 through around mid-June 2010.”
23
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“proceed further with reform of the RMB exchange rate regime and to enhance RMB exchange
rate flexibility.”28 As of April 8, 2013, the United States dollar to Chinese RMB exchange rate
was trading at approximately 6.20 yuan, with a daily float allowance of 1.0%.29
Comparative Look at Monetary Policy Management
Exchange rate management is one cog in a much larger wheel of a nation’s broader
economic goals. Most of world’s major economies participate in certain actions to further these
objectives, and a comparative look between the two largest30 (the United States and China) will
demonstrate how China’s exchange rate management should be viewed at the international level.
Quantitative Easing in the United States
The financial crisis in 2008 was one of the worst catastrophes to hit the international
economy since the Great Depression. In order to counter widespread distrust in the financial
industry, inject liquidity into the markets, and restore order among global financial institutions,
the Federal Reserve started engaging in what is defined as “quantitative easing.”31 Quantitative
easing is a type of monetary policy where newly printed currency is used to purchase assets such
as Treasury Securities in order to promote economic stability and keep interest rates low.32 In a
statement from the Federal Reserve in January of 2013, the Federal Open Market Committee
justified such practice by stating it was “firmly committed to fulfilling its statutory mandate from
the Congress of promoting maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term

28

Id.
XE: THE WORLD’S FAVORITE CURRENCY SITE,
http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=USD&To=CNY (last visited April 22, 2013).
30
World’s largest economies as measured by 2012 Nominal GPD: United States at $15.7 trillion, China at $8.2
trillion. World Economic Outlook: Hopes, Risks, Realities, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/pdf/text.pdf) (retrieved April 16, 2013).
31
Andrew Bowman et al., Central Bank-Led Capitalism?, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 455, 468 (2013).
32
Id.
29

7

interest rates.”33 This strategy was particularly important in 2008, when the Federal Reserve
printed U.S. Dollars to purchase troubled assets from mortgage lenders Freddie Mae and Fannie
Mae to help curb the effects of the housing bubble collapse.34
In practice, quantitative easing boils down to printing more money and lending it to
banks at near zero-interest rates, in an effort to increase lending and stimulate the economy.35
These efforts have not been without widespread criticism from the international community. As
the United States simultaneously criticized China for keeping the RMB below market rates, it
was flooding the capital markets with an increased supply of dollars. Xia Bin, an adviser to the
central bank of China, stated that as “long as the world exercises no restraint in issuing global
currencies such as the dollar – and this is not easy – then the occurrence of another crisis in
inevitable.”36 Notable economists and finance ministers from Thailand, Hong Kong, and the
Eurozone have also expressed concern and caution over the use of continued quantitative easing
in the United States.37
Throwing non-protectionist political rhetoric at a monetary policy such as quantitative
easing, a popular strategy among its proponents in the United States, does not lessen the artificial
effects it has on the global economy. Stripping away United States political rhetoric and
33

Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM, (as effective Jan. 29, 2013) available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC_LongerRunGoals.pdf.
34
See generally Mark Sunshine, Experts Agree The Fed’s in Big Trouble, FORBES, (Apr. 23, 2013).
35
Larry Elliot, Quantitative Easing, GUARDIAN (Jan 8, 2009), available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/14/businessglossary.
36
Bettina Wassener, Emerging-Market Countries Criticize Fed Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/05/business/global/05global.html?_r=0.
37
Id. “In Thailand, Finance Minister Korn Chatikavanij said the central bank governor had ‘confirmed discussions
with central banks of neighboring countries, which are ready to impose measures together, if needed, to curb
possible speculative money flowing into the region,’ according to Reuters. Norman Chan, chief executive of the
Hong Kong Monetary Authority, warned that the Fed’s new measures — informally known as QE2, denoting the
second round of what is called quantitative easing — added to the risk of asset bubbles, including a bubble in the
city’s housing sector. ‘For emerging markets, QE2 means a guarantee of the ‘low for longer’ scenario through the
first half of 2011, which suggests inflows into emerging markets will continue, if not strengthen,’ Richard Yetsenga
and Pablo Goldberg, analysts at HSBC, said in a note on Thursday. ‘The tide generated by the liquidity from abroad
is bigger than whatever wall emerging market countries can put up.’“
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justifications from Ben Bernanke does not detract from the fact that the Federal Reserve is
actively distorting the international economic environment. By guaranteeing the purchase of
Treasury Securities and injecting more capital into the markets, everything from the true value of
the dollar, commodity prices, and global interest rates are going to deviate from what they would
be under a true market-based system free from governmental intervention.38 So how does this
differ from China’s perceived “currency manipulation?” Interestingly, a report came out in April
2013 that a woman in the Kunming Province in China filed a lawsuit against the United States
for devaluing her United States Dollar holdings, $250, through the use of quantitative easing.39
Though she is only seeking $1 in damages, and a “promise from the U.S. central bank to stop
abusing its ‘monopoly’ over currency creation,”40 it is interesting to see that the rest of the world
has taken notice and noted frustration over the potentially hypocritical monetary policies being
embraced in the United States. The next section explores the policies and actions taken by the
Chinese government used to keep its exchange rate within its stated target.
Exchange Rate Management in China
There are two primary methods that China uses to keep the exchange rate within the
stated target and 1.0% trading band. The first is active participation in foreign exchange
markets: “[A]t the first sign of an appreciating RMB, the Chinese government respond[s] by
increasing the supply of RMB and decreasing the supply of another nation’s currency by
purchasing that nation’s currency on the currency market, thus restoring the desired
equilibrium.”41 This method in particular has led to China’s massive accumulation of dollar
38

Id.
Michael Kitchen, Chinese women reportedly wants to sue Federal Reserve over QE, MARKETWATCH, (April 15,
2013) http://blogs.marketwatch.com/thetell/2013/04/15/china-woman-reportedly-wants-to-sue-federal-reserve-overqe/.
40
Id.
41
Paul V. Sharobeem, Biting the Hand That Feeds Us: A Critical Analysis of U.S. Policy Trends Concerning
Chinese Currency Manipulation, 19 FLA. J. INT'L L. 697, 698 (2007)
39
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denominated securities, specifically United States Treasury bonds. Instead of holding actual
dollars in their foreign reserve, which are likely only to decrease in value over time due to
inflation and the time value of money, the Chinese government invests these accumulated dollars
in (nearly) risk-free United States Treasury securities.42 As of December 2012, China held more
than $3.3 trillion in foreign currency reserves,43 and more than $1.2 trillion in U.S. Treasury
Securities.44
The second method China employs when trying to maintain the target exchange rate is
strict capital controls. For example “the Chinese government required firms in China to exchange
most of their hard currency earnings to the central government in exchange for RMB. While the
Chinese government did eventually [post-merger of the dual exchange system] allow the RMB to
be free convertible ‘for purposes of trade in goods and services,’ capital transactions remained
subject to strict controls to curtail unpredictable flows of capital into or out of the country. This
meant while the RMB was convertible for trade transactions, it was still not freely convertible for
other types of financial flows such as portfolio investments.”45 As explained in Part III, however,
in recent years China has been implementing reforms to loosen these capital restrictions and
encourage foreign investment in mainland China.
The Chinese government defends these actions by claiming a carefully managed RMB is
important to maintain economic stability, not to gain an unfair advantage in trade.46 They further
claim that abandoning their current currency policy could lead to wide-scale layoffs, particularly

42

Paul V. Sharobeem, Biting the Hand that Feeds Us: A Critical Analysis of U.S. Policy Trends Concerning
Chinese Currency Manipulation, 19 Fla. J. Int’l L. 697 (2007) at 700.
43
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Int’l Affairs, Report to Cong. On Int’l Econ. and Exch. Rate Policies (April
12, 2013) available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-ratepolicies/Documents/Foreign%20Exchange%20Report%20April%202013.pdf.
44
Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/mfh(shl2012).txt.
45
Sharobeem, supra note 42, at 698-99.
46
WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33536, China-U.S. Trade Issues (2012).
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in the fragile manufacturing sector, and thereby lead to political unrest and threaten national
stability.47 Another concern is the underdeveloped banking system in China that could be very
vulnerable to a rapid and drastic shift in the exchange rate policy.48 The banking sector’s intimate
relationship with state owned enterprises, coupled with a shock of speculative pressures likely to
stem from an immediately floating exchange rate could plunge the banking sector in China into a
financial crisis.49
Determining the Value of the RMB
There are a number of economic measures and indicators that can assist in determining
whether, and to what extent, a country’s currency is overvalued or undervalued. Two major
measures looked at by economists when determining the level of intervention and misalignment
are the current account surplus and foreign reserve accumulation.50 A current account surplus is a
situation where there exists an “imbalance in a nation’s balance of payments current account in
which payments received by the country for selling domestic exports are greater than payments
made by the country for purchasing imports.”51 When the surplus is significant, it implies that
export growth is substantially more significant than import growth, which is an economic effect
of having an undervalued currency. In 2007, China’s current account surplus reached a peak of
10.1% of its GDP.52 However, as a result of lower international demand for Chinese exports
during the financial crisis and a broader economic downturn, China’s current account surplus fell
to 2.3% of GPD in 2012.53 This drastic decrease, though still substantial relative to other
countries, shows there seems to be a gradual rebalancing of the Chinese economy and is contrary
47

Id.
Sharobeem, supra note 42, at 707-708.
49
Id.
50
Report to Cong. On Int’l Econ. and Exch. Rate Policies, supra note 43.
51
Definition of current account surplus, ECONOMIC GLOSSARY, http://glossary.econguru.com/economicterm/current+account+surplus (last visited Apr. 28, 2013).
52
Report to Cong. On Int’l Econ. and Exch. Rate Policies, supra note 43.
53
Id.
48
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to many claims that China is manipulating its currency specifically in an effort to gain an unfair
advantage in trade.
Another measure that indicates active participation in exchange rate misalignment is a
country’s accumulation of foreign reserves. Foreign reserve accumulation is the direct result of a
central bank’s active participation in foreign exchange markets, a practice the PBOC utilizes
when maintaining the exchange rate within its prescribed 1.0% daily trading band and target
exchange rate.54 While China’s accumulation of foreign reserves slowed to $21.3 billion per
quarter in the first three quarters of 2012, the first quarter of 2013 showed a record purchase of
$109.9 billion in foreign exchange by the PBOC and other financial institutions in China.55
These numbers, however, are based on estimates because China does not specifically disclose its
data on foreign exchange market activity.56 Also, although China is an active member of the
IMF, they do not subscribe to the Special Data Dissemination Standard57 on reserve transparency
nor do they report to the IMF’s Composition of Official Exchange Reserves Database.58 Failure
to report this crucial and specific data leads to further valuation difficulties when attempting to
determine what an actual market-based exchange rate would be for China.
So comes the million-dollar (or, RMB 6,165,000.0659) question: to what extent is the
RMB undervalued? Economists across the world have come up with estimates over the past
decade that vary wildly. In the IMF’s July 2012 Pilot External Sector Report it stated that the
RMB was “moderately” undervalued, between 5.0% to 10.0%, against a broad basket of
See Part I, section on mechanics of China’s mechanics of exchange rate management.
Report to Cong. On Int’l Econ. and Exch. Rate Policies, supra note 43.
56
Id.
57
Factsheet - IMF Standards for Data Dissemination, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/data.htm., (last visited Apr. 29, 2013).
58
Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/cofer/eng/, (last visited Apr. 29, 2013). “Data dissemination standards are
important because they help enhance the availability of timely and comprehensive statistics, which contributes to the
pursuit of sound macroeconomic policies and efficient functioning of financial markets.”
59
Based on a $1/RMB 6.17 exchange rate as cited by google.com on May 1, 2013.
54
55
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currencies.60 In 2012, Fred Bergstein recommended during testimony before the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee of Ways and Means that over the next three years China should let
its exchange rate appreciate by 20.0% to 25.0%.61 Other estimates over the past decade include a
12.0% to 50.0% range,62 40%,63 and a more modest 15.0 to 20.0% range.64 These estimates
prove one thing for certain: while it is generally agreed in the international economic community
that RMB exchange rate is held below what a natural market level would be, there is no
consensus on the actual valuation. Nevertheless, politicians in the United States are still calling
for unilateral action against China to combat these perceived unfair policies.

Potential Unilateral Policy Options for the United States

One of the most commonly advocated courses of action for the United States to respond
to China’s perceived currency manipulation is to treat it as an unfair trade practice under United
States trade law. This section will give an overview of existing trade law, including the Tariff
Act of 193065 and its countervailing duty and antidumping provisions, and the role of the
Commerce department in resolving trade disputes. Next this section will explore United States
legislative options that look to amend existing trade law, specifically the Currency Reform for
Fair Trade Act and the Currency Exchange Oversight Reform Act, and the inherent problems

60

Pilot External Sector Report: July 2, 2012, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/070212.pdf.
61
C. Fred Bergstein, Director, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Testimony before the Hearing on
China’s Exchange Rate Policy, Committee on Ways and Means, US House of Representatives (September 15,
2010).
62
Dorn, supra note 4.
63
Paul Eckert, Senate Approves China Yuan Bill, House Fate Unclear, REUTERS, (Oct. 11, 2011) available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/11/us-usa-china-idUSTRE79A5AO20111011
64
David E. Sanger & Michael Wines, More Countries Adopt China’s Tactics on Currency, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 3.
2010) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/04/world/04currency.html
65
19 U.S.C. § 1202, et. seq.(West)
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with both of these acts. Aside from these two main bills, a handful of other legislative options
have been explored in Congress, and a brief explanation (alongside why they ultimately failed)
will help illustrate the mindset of politicians in the United States as they advocate these bills.
This section will then explore the power of the Treasury Department, and the affirmative duties it
has under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 198866 in identifying countries it
deems to be currency manipulators.
United States Legislative Approaches by Amending Existing Trade Law
Overview of Existing United States Trade Law
Since its adoption, the Tariff Act of 1930 has provided the legal basis for the United
States to counter unfair practices in international trade.67 The countervailing duty and
antidumping provisions in the Tariff Act of 1930 are two major avenues used in the United
States to combat unfair international trade practices. Countervailing duties are imposed when is
it determined “that the government of a country or any public entity within the territory of a
country is providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable subsidy with respect to the
manufacture, production, or export of a class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely
to be sold) for importation, into the United States.”68 Countervailing duties deal directly with
foreign government action in subsidizing their domestic industries. The purpose, therefore, of the
United States in trying to counter these duties is to create equilibrium in international trade by
offsetting the unfair advantage gained by a foreign exporter to the United States through
governmental subsidization.69

66

Pub. L. 100-418, Aug. 23, 1988, 102 Stat. 1107 (West)
Sharobeem, supra note 42, at 713.
68
19 U.S.C.A. § 1671(a)(1) (2012) (West)
69
Royal Thai Gov’t v. United States, 502 F.Supp.2d 1334, 1340 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007).
67
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Antidumping laws, on the other hand, focus on private actors and determine “whether
subject merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold at less than fair value” in the United States
marketplace.70 Domestic competitors are thereby injured “when a company exports to the United
States at prices that are less than the normal value of its products.”71 Antidumping laws seek to
protect these domestic producers of goods who manufacture products similar to those that are
being sold by foreign exporters at injuriously low prices. “The central aim of the antidumping
laws is to protect domestic industries from foreign manufactured goods that are sold injuriously
in the United States at prices below the fair market value of those goods in their home market.”72
Though countervailing duty and antidumping laws deal with problems that have different
origins (i.e. government for countervailing duties and exporters for antidumping), investigations
and enforcement action are largely parallel. The first step for an “interested party”73 to initiate
either an antidumping or countervailing duty investigation is to file a petition with an
“administering authority.”74 The United States Department of Commerce (DOC) and the United
States International Trade Commission (ITC) then share responsibilities in both of these
proceedings, which include investigating whether an injury has occurred and the extent of that
injury with respect to domestic producers. 75
There is one case, Nucor Fastener Div. v. United States,76 where a United States producer
of steel fasteners filed suit under current law challenging Commerce’s decision not to conduct a
countervailing duty investigation of alleged Chinese subsidization through currency
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manipulation. Though Commerce conducted a countervailing duty investigation against China,
and in fact included twenty-six specific instances where Nucor alleged countervailable subsidies,
it declined to investigate the alleged currency manipulation as a subsidy issue.77 Commerce
stated in its investigation:
“[Nucor] alleges that the [government]-maintained exchange rate effectively prevents the
appreciation of the Chinese currency ([“RMB”]) against the U.S. dollar. Therefore, when
producers/exporters in the PRC sell their dollars at official foreign exchange banks, as required
by law, the producers receive more RMB than they otherwise would if the value of the RMB
were set by market mechanisms.... [Nucor] has failed to sufficiently allege that the receipt of the
excess RMB is contingent on export or export performance because receipt of the excess RMB is
independent of the type of transaction or commercial activity for which dollars are converted or
of the particular company or individuals converting the dollars. Therefore, we do not plan on
investigating this program because [Nucor] has failed to properly allege the specificity
element.”78
It is important to note that Commerce declined to investigate due to a jurisdictional issue, and did
not consider currency manipulation as an illegal subsidy on the merits. Nucor’s complaint was
dismissed because their challenge against Commerce was unripe.79 This case, however, sheds
light on the legislation being considered by Congress, and raises the question of whether United
States trade law is a reasonable and forum for consideration of alleged currency manipulation.
Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act
The Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act of 2013 was introduced and assigned to a
congressional committee on March 20, 2013.80 Its stated purpose is to “amend title VII of the
Tariff Act of 1930 to clarify that countervailing duties may be imposed to address subsidies
relating to a fundamentally undervalued currency of any foreign country.”81 Over the last number
of congressional sessions, versions of this bill have been introduced in both the House and
77
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Senate, and have garnered widespread bipartisan support.82 Though different versions of this bill
have passed both the House and Senate, no version has been enacted to date.
All versions of this bill would “clarify” that a “fundamentally misaligned currency” could
be considered an actionable subsidy by the DOC under existing countervailing duty laws.83 This
language implies that an undervalued currency acts as either a direct or indirect subsidy on
foreign exporters, and the United States should be able to impose additional duties on these
exports in order to prevent harm to domestic producers. First, the DOC would be required to
determine whether a country’s currency is fundamentally undervalued by looking at a number of
factors over a trailing 18-month period including active intervention in currency markets, at least
a 5 percent undervalued real effective exchange rate, significant and persistent global current
accounts surpluses, and the quantity of foreign asset reserves held by the foreign government.84
The bill directs the DOC to determine the extent of a country’s currency undervaluation by using
a number of different techniques depending on available data, including the valuation
methodologies employed by the IMF Consultative Group on Exchange Rate Issues, “generally
accepted economic and econometric techniques,” data from other international organizations or
governments, or “inflation-adjusted, trade-weighted exchange rates.”85 A similar bill has also
been bouncing around United States politics in recent years, which goes beyond the scope of the
Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act.
Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act
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The Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act86, which passed the Senate in 2011
but eventually died in the house, shares some similarities with the Currency Reform for Fair
Trade Act. In addition to amending countervailing duty law to include currency manipulation as
an actionable subsidy, as with the Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act, this bill imposes addition
duties on the Treasury and DOC:
“The bill would require the Treasury Department to issue a semiannual report to Congress on
international monetary policy and currency exchange rates, determine which major global
currencies are in fundamental misalignment, and designate certain misaligned currencies for
priority action. Treasury would be required to seek negotiations with countries designated for
priority action. If efforts were not made to correct the currency misalignment, the following
actions would be taken in regard to that country: (1) The Commerce Department would be
required to factor in the estimated level of currency undervaluation when determining
antidumping duties; (2) the President would be required to prohibit the procurement by the
federal government of products and services from the country unless it is a party to the WTO’s
GPA; (3) the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) would not be able to approve any
new financing with respect to a project located within the country; (4) the U.S. Executive
Director at each multilateral bank would be told to oppose the approval of any new financing to
the government of a country, or for a project located within a country, that issues a currency
designated for priority action. If a country that has a currency designated for priority action failed
to take steps to eliminate the fundamental misalignment within 360 days after its designation by
the Treasury Department, the following would occur: (1) the USTR would be required to initiate
a dispute resolution case against the priority country; (2) the Treasury Department would be
required to consult with the Federal Reserve System to consider undertaking remedial
intervention in international currency markets.”87
This bill, clearly, is more far-reaching than the Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act, and if ever
signed into law would be a serious shot across the bow of the Chinese government by compelling
interagency actions by the United States government against China. This bill also mandates that
currency undervaluation would need to be considered when calculating antidumping margins,
further amending trade law into unchartered and potentially dangerous waters. There are similar
arguments both in support and in criticism for this bill and the Currency Reform for Fair Trade
Act.
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Advocates for these options contend that an undervalued RMB is having a hugely
detrimental effect on the United States GDP and is a major contributing factor to job losses in the
United States, specifically in the manufacturing sector. In a report from the House Ways and
Means committee, the committee cites an estimate from Paul Krugman, a Nobel Prize winning
economist, that the United States GDP is reduced by 1.4% annually as a direct result of an
undervalued RMB.88 Fred Bergstein, an economist at the Peterson Institute, is also referred to in
the report in claiming that allowing the RMB to appreciate to a true market rate would create
approximately 500,000 manufacturing jobs in the United States.89 In testimony before the
Committee on Ways and Means in 2010, Mr. Bergstein specifically claimed that “[u]nder current
conditions of high unemployment, an improvement of $50 billion to $120 billion in the U.S.
trade balance would generate 300,000 to 700,000 new U.S. jobs.”90
There is also substantial opposition to these legislative options. In a letter to Congress,
members of the business community expressed concern over such unilateral retaliatory measures.
Authored by organizations including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Foreign
Trade Council, and the U.S.-China Business Council, among others, the letter highlights many
negative consequences such action could trigger.91 The broad message embodied by this letter is
that the very complex U.S.-China economic relationship cannot be resolved through targeting a
specific issue such as exchange rate management, and taking unilateral retaliatory action as
suggested in this bill would compromise other aspects of the relationship including intellectual
property rights, market access issues, and liberalization of the Chinese financial services
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industry.92 They also express hesitation that the legislation would have its intended effect of
forcing China to rapidly reform their exchange rate policy, but instead could spark a currency or
trade war that would have near universal negative consequences across the world.93
Other Unilateral Options for the United States
Countervailing Currency Intervention
Another option being considered by some commentators, and which is also part of the
Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011, is countervailing currency intervention.
Mr. Bergsten, mentioned above, suggests that when China (or other alleged currency
manipulators, such as Japan) intervenes in the foreign exchange markets, the Treasury should
sell an equivalent amount of U.S. dollars or dollar-denominated assets to counter the effects on
the exchange rate.94 There are, of course, technical problems involved when trying to actively
intervene because the RMB is inconvertible for capital transactions. Mr. Bergsten suggests using
proxies such as debt instruments and futures contracts through third-party intermediaries that
would have the same constructive effect of a direct countervailing currency intervention.95
Treasury Department
Twice a year, pursuant to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, the
Treasury Department is required to determine if any country is manipulating their currency to
either gain an unfair advantage in trade or to prevent effective balance of payments
adjustments.96 If a country is deemed to be manipulating their currency for one of these reasons,
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the Treasury Department is thus compelled to initiate negotiations with the country, and if
necessary, bring a complaint to an international economic organization.97
The last time the Treasury Department labeled a country as a currency manipulator was
July 1994, prior to China’s major reforms as discussed in Part I, where it stated that “[b]ased on
China’s continued reliance on foreign exchange restrictions, it is Treasury’s judgment that China
manipulates its exchange system to prevent balance of payments adjustment and gain unfair
advantage in trade.”98 Since 1994, however, the Treasury Department has not named any country
as a currency manipulator for reasons of gaining an unfair advantage in trade or to prevent
effective balance of payment adjustments.99
Recommendations for the Unilateral United States Options
My first recommendation regarding unilateral United States option would be for
Congress to abandon the idea of amending our existing trade law to include currency
intervention as an actionable subsidy under either countervailing duty or antidumping law.
Proponents of such legislation assure the bills are WTO-consistent, because the United States
and other members of the WTO are within their rights to take remedial measures to counter
unfair trade practices in the form of countervailable subsidies (which would include currency
manipulation under the new bill). However, there is no precedent in the WTO of classifying a
country’s exchange rate policy as a form of countervailable subsidy. If the United States imposed
additional duties on China based on an undervalued RMB, China has the power to bring action

97

Id.
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Interim Report to Cong. On Int’l Econ. and Exch. Rate Policy (July 1994), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-ratepolicies/Documents/Report%20to%20the%20Congress%20on%20International%20Economic%20and%20Exchang
e%20Rate%20Policies%20-%20July%201994.pdf
99
General Accountability Office, Treasury Assessments Have Not Found Currency Manipulation, but Concerns
about Exchange Rates Continue, Report GAO-05-351, April 2005, available at
http://gao.gov/new.items/d05351.pdf.
98

21

through the WTO.100 In order for the United States to be successful in such an action, it would
not matter that amended United States trade law would classify currency manipulation as an
actionable subsidy. Currency manipulation would still need to be classified as a subsidy under
the WTO treaty, something the WTO has not made any indication that it has intentions to do.101
Another glaring problem would be placing specific valuation on the extent of RMB
misalignment. As explained in Part I, estimates range anywhere from 5.0% to 50.0%, and the
bills as introduced would give the DOC great flexibility in determining what the exchange rate
should be. This would in effect be telling China that “we [the United States] alone know the true
value of the dollar-yuan exchange rate and have the authority to unilaterally penalize Chinese
companies for pricing their products using the official exchange rate.”102As explained above,
there has never been a successful action brought through the DOC naming deliberate currency
devaluation as either a direct or indirect subsidy by a foreign government.103 This course of
action, if followed through to actual imposition of duties, would apply additional duties on all
exports from China, whereas countervailing duty law has historically been used to target industry
or sector specific action. This has the potential to spark retaliatory measures by the China.
Furthermore, there is danger that these actions are not WTO compliant, which raises additional
concerns that members of Congress should consider.
Adjusting antidumping margins to account for exchange rate misalignment would also
run into problems. Conceptually, antidumping penalizes individual companies who price their
products at levels below fair-market value and sell in foreign markets, thereby hurting domestic
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producers in those foreign markets.104 Anticompetitive currency undervaluation, on the other
hand, deals with macroeconomic policies that individual companies have no control over.105 “If
exchange rate undervaluation were to be taken into account in [antidumping] calculations, a
product that is not dumped will suddenly have a dumping margin.”106 This is parallel to the
problems faced with imposing countervailing duties across the board on all Chinese companies,
when the real focus should be on the macroeconomic policies being embraced at the highest
levels of the Chinese government. While amending trade law does not seem like a viable option,
there may be actions the Treasury could take through the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act if it were amended to reflect more accurately upon the current economic climate.
Instead of reverting back to pre-2005 reform treatment of China’s exchange policies
under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which requires a strict “yes or no”
determination of whether a country is manipulating its currency for illegitimate reasons, I
suggest potential amendments or clarifications to the Act which might create tiers or levels of
currency intervention that could compel different actions by the Treasury. Instead of coming out
and labeling China (or other countries) as a currency manipulator, having different categories
that reflect the potential harm being done in the international community as a result of differing
degrees of intervention could have differing degrees of compulsory action against the
counterparty. Of course, this suggestion still falls under the umbrella of unilateral action by the
United States and runs the risk of retaliatory or reactionary measures by those given a specific
label, but it may inject more usefulness into the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 which has not compelled any serious remedial action in nearly 20 years.
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A Balanced Multilateral Approach
Given the rapidly expanding rate of globalization, China’s recent ascension to a global
economic superpower, and the current state of the global economy,107 it makes more logical
sense to approach exchange rate misalignment on a multilateral basis. First this section will
explore adversarial options that include appealing to organizations such as the WTO and IMF.
Next it will discuss international economic forums, specifically the Group of Twenty, and I will
make recommendations based on recent pledges by the Chinese government made to the
international community.
International Economic Organizations
As made clear by the preceding sections, any unilateral action by the United States,
though potentially helpful to members of Congress looking to get reelected, is likely to be
ineffective, potentially hypocritical, and perhaps will violate commitments made by the United
States to the WTO. Yet year after year these bills get introduced and bounced around through
Congress, likely with the intention to show China that if they do not continue with substantial
currency reform, we have weapons in our arsenal that are ready to counter these perceived unfair
trade practices.
A more sensible, and likely more effective approach is a collaborative, multilateral
engagement between the United States, China, and other leading global economies. This section
will first explore the existing international organizations of the WTO and IMF and how they may
handle allegations of currency manipulation. Next this section will take a look at the Group of
Twenty, and examine the potential for multilateral engagement through this cooperative
107
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international forum. Finally, I will make recommendations that combine some of the beneficial
aspects of each, which would help promote cooperation and mutually beneficial action.
Appealing to the World Trade Organization or the International Monetary Fund
Appealing to international economic organizations such as the WTO or IMF, at first
glance, seems like a logical and potentially effective means of settling exchange rate
management disputes. However, there exists somewhat of a paradox between these two
organizations where exchange rate misalignment seems to fall through the cracks: while the
WTO is charged with governing rules concerning international trade, and possesses relatively
effective enforcement mechanisms108, the IMF has jurisdiction over exchange rate issues but
lacks any effective means of enforcement.109
The WTO is the premier international organization for promoting fair trade practices
among all of its members.110 Its primary focus is on traditional unfair trade practices such as
government subsidies to domestic industries.111 However, similar to the problems faced under
United States trade law as evidenced by the legislation described above, it is unclear that
intentional currency undervaluation would be considered an actionable subsidy under the
existing WTO framework. China has repeatedly stated that its exchange rate policy is not
designed to give it an unfair advantage in international trade, a threshold requirement under both
United States and international law, but to promote economic stability.112 Therefore, this
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exchange policy “cannot be said to frustrate the intent of GATT in contravention of Article XV
given its role is raising living standards and employment.”113
China also generally seems to be in compliance with IMF obligations regarding exchange
rate management. The IMF was established during the Bretton Woods meetings, and now has
near universal membership with the exception of North Korea, the Vatican, and a handful of
small European countries.114 Its main purposes are to maintain equilibrium in members’ balance
of payments and to stabilize currency exchange rates.115 A careful and in-depth analysis done by
Bryan Mercurio and Celine Sze Ning Leung in “Is China a ‘Currency Manipulator’?: The
Legitimacy of China’s Exchange Regime Under the Current International Legal Framework”
concludes that China is in compliance with the IMF articles agreement, specifically its technical
determination of its exchange rate, mechanics used to maintain the rate within a targeted range,
and capital controls used to monitor financial flows into and out of the country.116 Even if it
could be proven that China was in violation of the IMF articles of agreement, the IMF lacks any
serious mode of enforcement and would likely be hesitant to employ such drastic measures
unless a very serious situation called for it.
Bringing an action against China with either the WTO or IMF with respect to currency
manipulation is unlikely to be successful to any serious degree. The only likely outcome is that
such action would most likely just lead to strained U.S.-China relations by what some consider
simply boils down to a “name-and-shame” tactic against China.117
The Group of Twenty and International Economic Forums
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The “Group of Twenty, or G-20, is a forum for advancing international economic
cooperation and coordination among 20 major advanced and emerging-market
economies.”118The G-20’s predecessor, the G-7, was made up of Canada, France, Italy, Japan,
the United Kingdom, and the United States, and was formed after World War II in an effort to
coordinate international economic efforts.119 While the G-7 still convenes periodically, the G-20
has become the premier forum for advancing international economic cooperation and has added
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South
Korea, and the European Union.120 The G-20 was officially formed in 1999 with its first meeting
in Canada the following year.121 but held its first summit in 2008 in Washington, D.C., in a
response to the global financial crisis.122 The G-20 members now represent two-thirds of the
world’s population, 90% of global GPD, 80% of world trade, and produce 84% of the world’s
fossil fuel emissions.123 On its website, the G-20 claims its major accomplishments include
“strengthening the role of emerging economies, such as BRICS, reforming international financial
institutions, improving discipline and tightening oversight over national financial institutions and
regulators, improving the quality of financial regulations in economies whose regulatory
problems led to the crisis, and creating financial and organizational safety nets to prevent severe
economic slumps in the future.”124
In theory, an economic forum of this size and breadth should be an effective means to
attaining international economic stability and cooperation. One instance where the G-20 has
proven to be remarkably effective was during the financial crisis of 2008. When member
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countries were faced with very serious and dire financial problems, each had an incentive to sit
down at the bargaining table and work out mutually beneficial solutions to problems being faced
worldwide.125 Critics however claim, that similar to the IMF, any agreements or pronouncements
made during these G-20 meetings and summits lack any meaningful enforcement mechanism
beyond “naming and shaming.”126
Recommendation
A nation’s exchange rate policy is one facet of a highly complex global economic
landscape, and a system of threats, sanctions, and name-calling is not a sustainable or effective
strategy to promote general international prosperity. Recent economic indicators continue to
show that the RMB has been consistently appreciating against the dollar, and other econometrics
imply that imbalances between China and the United States are gradually moving toward
equilibrium. Since major currency reforms began in 2005, the RMB has appreciated 33.8%
based on the real effective exchange rate, which accounts for other monetary pressures such as
inflation and a country’s purchasing power.127 China’s economy has been growing at dizzying
rates over the past decade, but recently it has started to cool off. In 2011 its real GPD growth
slowed to 9.1%, and further in 2012 to 7.8%.128 Consensus forecasts see China’s GPD growth
stabilizing around 8.0% over the next two years.129 Despite this strong growth, the global
economic environment weakened in the latter half of 2012, partly due to decreased export output
from Japan and the Euro Zone.130
In March 2013 at the National People’s Congress, China’s new leadership pledged to
“steadily carry out reforms to make interest rates and the RMB exchange rate more market125
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based.”131 These pledges were a reiteration of the February 2013 G-20 Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors Meeting in Moscow, where China pledged not to “target exchange rates
for competitive purposes, and reaffirmed their commitment to move more rapidly toward more
market-determined exchange rate systems and exchange rate flexibility to reflect underlying
fundamentals.”132 They also pledged only to actively intervene in foreign exchange markets
when necessary to quell excessive volatility.133
These promises made by Chinese leadership seem to be in line with what the rest of the
global economic community, specifically the United States, has been looking for from China for
years. A number of steps should be taken by China in the coming years to help its exchange rate
reach a market-determined rate as they have committed to at the G-20.
A first step China could take is to continue to further liberalize its capital controls.
Recently, the global community has seen limited progress in this area:
“In line with its commitments in the SE&D, China more than doubled the total dollar amount
that foreigners can invest in China’s stock and bond markets under its Qualified Investor
Institutional Investor program from $30 billion to $80 billion. China has also permitted some
offshore banks and financial institutions to invest RMB holdings into the domestic interbank
bond market; allowed for the development of cross-border exchange traded funds between Hong
Kong and mainland China; made it easier for domestic Chinese firms to raise funds in the
offshore market by issuing offshore RMB-denominated bonds; [among other things].”134

China should continue with these financial reforms, and the United States should encourage this
reform with investment and support form its long-established financial institutions.
Another step China should take is to increase its foreign exchange transparency by
subscribing to the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standard135 on reserve transparency and
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report to the IMF’s Composition of Official Exchange Reserves Database.136 This cooperation
with international standards would give legitimacy to the promises being made by China’s new
leadership and prove to the global economic community that their exchange rate policies are not
being carried out for illegitimate reasons.
If China continues with gradual appreciation of the RMB, loosens capital controls, and
follows through with promises made during G-20 meetings and other international economic
summits, no action by the United States or any other organization is necessary. As explained in
Part I, an immediate and drastic appreciation of the RMB could have a doomsday effect on the
Chinese economy, specifically the underdeveloped banking system and manufacturing sector.
The United States should adopt a wait-and-see approach, and give the new Chinese
administration the opportunity to carry out its promises. But what if China does not? What if
capital controls tighten, rapid foreign reserve accumulation and market intervention persists (or
grows as in the first quarter of 2013), and the RMB is significantly undervalued? The only viable
option would be inter-organization cooperation.
While the WTO does not seem to have jurisdiction over exchange rate issues, and the
IMF and G-20 do not have any enforcement mechanisms, a combination of the strengths of each
could act as an enforcer for deliberate and detrimental exchange rate misalignments. Currently
there is an interagency agreement between the WTO and IMF, and this could be amended to
overcome the obstacles facing both organizations’ treatment of exchange rate issues.137 I believe
adding the G-20 to this agreement could give proclamations and promises made much more
force. A framework as follows could be effective in promoting and enforcing global exchange
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rate policies. First, leaders from the G-20 meet annually to set goals regarding exchange rate
policies and reforms which include specific targets for each member nation. Once an agreement
is reached, the agreement could be submitted to the IMF for monitoring. During periodic
reviews, if the IMF determines a country is in violation of its agreement, it could refer the matter
to the WTO for enforcement or compulsory dispute resolution. If the country refuses to comply
with any part of this process, then the IMF in conjunction with the World Bank would have the
power to engage in countervailing currency intervention.138 Countervailing currency intervention
initiated from a global economic organization would be more beneficial and likely more
effective than unilateral action as proposed by some in the United States.

Conclusion

Trying to isolate foreign exchange policy as an independent economic issue is not an
effective macroeconomic management strategy. Blaming an undervalued RMB for America’s
economic woes is politically attractive for United States politicians because it creates a
boogeyman that distracts the American people from many of the internal problems created by
these same politicians. Instead of the United States grabbing a torch and pitchfork and trying to
force the world’s second largest economy to undergo a radical and immediate rebalancing of its
economy, we should continue negotiations and talks to help promote a gradual and fair
rebalancing of the global economy as a whole. Empowering existing international economic
organizations to take action when there is indeed an abuse of the system is the only way for such
action to gain legitimacy, and would keep the focus on those committing the wrongs and not
138

As described in Part II, but initiated and carried out by the World Band and IMF rather than unilaterally by the
United States.
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those who are the accusers. “Multilateralism – with a more prominent role for emerging market
countries – is essential now to prevent competitive currency debauchery by China and the US
from blowing up the system.”139

139

Arvind Subramanian, America cannot win the currency wars alone, FINANCIAL TIMES, OCT. 20, 2010, available
at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7fb95280-dc8b-11df-a0b9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2S9dBW8dy.
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